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We address three questions relating to the interest rate options market: What is the shape of the smile? What are the economic deter-
minants of the shape of the smile? Do these determinants have predictive power for the future shape of the smile and vice versa? We
investigate these issues using daily bid and ask prices of euro (€) interest rate caps/floors. We find a clear smile pattern in interest rate
options. The shape of the smile varies over time and is affected in a dynamic manner by yield curve variables and the future uncertainty in
the interest rate markets; it also has information about future aggregate default risk. Our findings are useful for the pricing, hedging and
risk management of these derivatives.
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Over-the-counter interest rate options such as caps/
floors are among the most liquid options that trade in
the global financial markets, with about $37 trillion of
notional principal and $580 billion in gross market value
outstanding as of June 2006.3 Given the enormous size of
these markets, significant effort has been devoted, both in
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However, most of these studies have focused on at-the-
money options, with little attention paid to the determi-
nants of volatility smiles/skews in interest rate options mar-
kets.5 In this paper, we address this issue in the euro (€)
interest rate options market by characterizing the smile,
its time variation and its economic determinants. We also
examine the information content of interest rate option
smiles, in order to understand whether it has any statistical
power in predicting specific macro-economic variables.
Volatility smiles are an extensively documented cross-
sectional feature in the equity options markets, ever since4 These include Driessen et al. (2003), Fan et al. (2003), Longstaff et al.
(2001), Peterson et al. (2003), and many others.
5 Gupta and Subrahmanyam (2005), Jarrow et al. (2007) do examine
smile effects in interest rate options, but only from a modeling perspective.
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they were first reflected in option prices after the October
1987 stock market crash. Indeed, the focus of much of
the research in the equity options literature has primarily
been to relax the assumptions of the Black-Scholes valua-
tion framework to model the volatility smile patterns
observed in the market. The frameworks proposed have
evolved from models with deterministically varying volatil-
ity of returns to models that incorporate either stochastic
volatility, or jumps in the underlying price process, or
both.6 In spite of their increasing complexity, none of these
models has been successful in accurately explaining the
behavior of the observed volatility smiles – the empirically
observed smiles are typically more perceptible than those
predicted by theory. Effort has also been devoted to
explaining the volatility smile in equity options markets
using liquidity effects or market frictions, with some suc-
cess.7 However, very little research has been conducted
on directly examining the economic determinants of the
volatility smile patterns in the options markets. An excep-
tion is the paper by Pena et al. (1999), who examine the
determinants of the implied volatility function in the Span-
ish equity index options market.
In contrast to the literature on equity options, research
on the smile in the interest rate options market has been
quite sparse. The sole exception is a paper by Jarrow
et al. (2007) who examine the smile in US dollar caps
and floors, and find that even models augmented with
stochastic volatility and jumps do not fully capture the
smile.
The conclusions from equity options markets cannot be
readily extended to interest rate option markets, since these
markets differ significantly from each other for several rea-
sons. First, in contrast to equity option markets, interest
rate option markets are almost entirely institutional, with
hardly any retail presence. Most interest rate options, par-
ticularly the long-dated ones such as caps, floors and swap-
tions, are sold over-the-counter (OTC) by large market
makers, typically international banks. The customers are
usually on one side of the market (the ask-side), and the
size of individual trades is relatively large. Second, many
popular interest rate option products, such as caps, floors
and collars are portfolios of options, from relatively
short-dated to extremely long-dated ones. These features
lead to significant issues relating to supply/demand and
asymmetric information that are different from those for
exchange traded equity options. Third, since interest rate
options are traded in an OTC market, there are also impor-
tant credit risk issues that may influence the pricing of these
options, especially during periods of crisis. Therefore,
inferences drawn from studies in the equity option markets
are not directly relevant for interest rate option markets,





6 See Bakshi et al. (1997), Dumas et al. (1998), Bates (2000) and several
references therein for more on this literature.
7 See Ederington and Guan (2002), Mayhew (2002), Pena et al. (1999,
2001), Bollen and Whaley (2004), Garleanu et al. (2006), for example.








Given the limited success of attempts to model the distri-
bution of the underlying to explain the smile, we adopt a
different approach. We seek to directly examine the eco-
nomic determinants of the smile. To give an analogy, our
approach is similar to finding empirical risk factors as
opposed to calibrating utility-based models in order to
explain the cross-section of stock returns, in the asset pric-
ing literature. In this paper, we contribute to the literature
in three distinct ways. First, we present an extensive docu-
mentation of the volatility smile patterns in the interest rate
options markets for different maturities, separately for the
bid and the ask-sides of the market. Second, we explore
the determinants of volatility smiles in these markets, in
terms of macro-economic and liquidity variables. Third,
we examine the bidirectional Granger–causality between
volatility smiles and the macro-economic and liquidity vari-
ables to understand the dynamic nature of these
relationships.
We find that there are clearly perceptible volatility
smiles in caps and floors, across all maturities. Short-term
caps and floors exhibit smiles that are significantly steeper
than those for longer-term caps and floors. Long-term
options display more of a ‘‘smirk’’ than a smile. Measures
of the shape of the volatility smile (slope and curvature) are
significantly related to term structure variables. In particu-
lar, the curvature of the smile is positively related to the 6-
month interest rate for shorter maturity options and nega-
tively related to the slope of the term structure for longer
maturity options. This suggests that away-from-the-money
options, especially of shorter maturity, are significantly
more expensive (compared to at-the-money options), dur-
ing higher interest rate regimes. On the other hand, the
away-from-the-money options are comparatively less
expensive when the term structure is relatively flat. Our
results for the slope of the volatility smile show that out-
of-the money caps (floors) become disproportionately more
expensive when interest rates go up (down). This may be a
result of the existence of price pressure in this market
induced by hedging demand from customers, consistent
with some of the results reported in Bollen and Whaley
(2004) and Garleanu et al. (2006). Alternatively, the slope
of the yield curve may capture the skew of the distribution
of future interest rate, and thus affect the slope of the smile.
These relationships between the term structure variables
and the smile variables also hold for their innovations.
In addition, we find that high-volatility periods are asso-
ciated with flatter volatility smiles, suggesting a stochastic
volatility framework with mean reversion in volatility.
We also find evidence that the curvature of the smile for
longer maturity options is positively related to the liquidity
costs in this market, as proxied by the bid–ask spreads. We
conjecture that, perhaps, liquidity effects could account for
a part of the smile, especially for longer maturity options.
We use multivariate Granger–causality tests to examine
if lagged values of any of the explanatory variables can pre-
dict the curvature and asymmetry of the volatility smile
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Granger-causes the slope and the curvature of the volatility
smile, while the slope of the term structure Granger-causes
the curvature of the smile curve. We also find that slope of
the volatility smile curve can predict the aggregate default
spread, even after controlling for the persistence in the
default spread, and in the lagged values of yield curve vari-
ables. The impulse response function shows that a positive
shock to the slope of the smile of shorter maturity options
is followed by an increase in the default spread. This is
intuitive because a higher slope of the smile implies higher
relative prices of out-of-the-money floors that hedge the
risk of falling interest rates, which are associated with an
economic downturn and higher default risk, and thus, an
increase in the default spread.
The results of our paper have important implications for
the modeling and risk management of interest rate deriva-
tives, especially options. We find that even after controlling
for the persistence in the shape of the smile, lags of the 6-
month interest rate and the slope of the yield curve have
information about future shapes of the smile. Usually,
while calibrating the interest rate option models, only the
contemporaneous yield curve is used. Our results suggest
that using lagged values of the short-term interest rate
and the slope of the yield curve could improve the calibra-
tion of these models. This is intuitive if the future distribu-
tion of interest rates is not fully captured by today’s yield
curve, but, in addition, depends on the past values of inter-
est rates. Our results also have implications for the model-
ing of credit derivatives, whose payoffs depend on the
default spread, since we find that the shape of the smile
can predict the default spread.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2
describes the data set and presents summary statistics. Sec-
tion 3 presents the empirical patterns of the volatility smile
that we observe in the data. In Section 4, we examine the
impact of several macro-economic variables on these pat-
terns. Section 5 presents the results of the multivariate vec-
tor autoregression and the Granger–causality tests. Section
6 concludes with a summary of the main results and direc-
tions for future research. O 246247
8 The euro OTC interest rate derivatives market is extremely compet-
itive, especially for plain-vanilla contracts like caps and floors. The BIS
estimates the Herfindahl index (sum of squares of market shares of all
participants) for euro interest rate options (which includes exotic options)
at about 500–600 during the period from 1999 to 2004, which is even lower
than that for USD interest rate options (around 1,000). Since a lower
value of this index (away from the maximum possible value of 10,000)
indicates a more competitive market, it is safe to rely on option quotes
from a top European derivatives dealer (reflecting the best market
consensus information available with them) like WestLB during our
sample period. Thus, any dealer-specific effects on price quotes are likely
to be small and unsystematic across the over 30,000 bid and ask price
quotes each that are used in this paper.
9 For the details of the contract structure for caps and floors, please refer
to Longstaff et al. (2001) for the US dollar market and to Deuskar et al.
(2007) for the Euro market.U
N
C2. Data
The data for this study consist of prices of euro (€) caps
and floors over the 29-month period, January 1999 to May
2001, obtained from WestLB (Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale) Global Derivatives and Fixed Income
Group. These are daily bid and offer quotes over 591 trad-
ing days for nine maturities (2 years to 10 years, in annual
increments) across twelve different strike rates ranging
from 2% to 8%. This is an extensive set with price quotes
for caps and floors every day, reflecting the maturity-strike
combinations that elicit market interest on that day.
WestLB is one of the dealers who subscribe to the inter-
est rate option valuation service from Totem. Totem is the








vices, supporting independent price verification and risk
management in the global financial markets. Most leading
derivative dealers subscribe to their service. As part of this
service, Totem collects data for the entire range of caplets
and floorlets across a series of maturities from these deal-
ers. They aggregate this information and return the consen-
sus values back to the dealers who contribute data to the
service. The market consensus values supplied to the deal-
ers include the underlying term structure data, caplet and
floorlet prices, as well as the prices and implied volatilities
of the reconstituted caps and floors across strikes and
maturities. Hence, the prices quoted by dealers such as
WestLB, who are a part of this service, reflect the mar-
ket-wide consensus information about these products. This
is especially true for plain-vanilla caps and floors, which
are very high-volume products with standardized struc-
tures, that are also used by dealers to calibrate their models
for pricing and hedging exotic derivatives. Therefore, it is
extremely unlikely that any large dealer, especially one that
uses a market data integrator such as Totem, would deviate
systematically from market consensus prices for these
vanilla products.8 Our discussions with market participants
confirm that the prices quoted by different dealers (espe-
cially those that subscribe to Totem) for vanilla caps and
floors are generally similar.
Interest rate caps and floors are portfolios of European
interest rate options on the 6-month Euribor with a 6
monthly reset frequency.9 In addition to the options data,
we also collected data on euro (€) swap rates and the daily
term structure of euro interest rates curve from the same
source. These are the key inputs necessary for checking
cap-floor parity, as well as for conducting our subsequent
empirical tests. We calculate the ‘‘moneyness’’ of the
options by estimating the log moneyness ratio (LMR) for
each cap/floor. The LMR is defined as the logarithm of
the ratio of the par swap rate to the strike rate of the
option. Since the relevant swap rate changes every day,
the LMR of options at the same strike rate and maturity
also changes each day.
We pool the data on caps and floors to obtain a wider
range of strike rates, on both sides of the at-the-money
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some individual observations.10 These parity computations
are a consistency check, as well, to assure us about the







































3. Shapes of the volatility smile in interest rate option
markets
We use implied volatilities from the Black-BGM (Black,
1976; Brace et al., 1997 (BGM)) model, throughout the
analysis. We do so for two reasons. First, although there
may be an alternative complex model that explains at least
part of the smile/skew or the term structure of volatility, it
is necessary to obtain an initial sense of the empirical reg-
ularities using the standard model. In other words, we need
to document the characteristics of the smile before attempt-
ing to model it formally.11 Furthermore, the evidence in the
equity option markets suggests that even such complex
models may not explain the volatility smile adequately,
without considering the effect of market frictions. Second,
Black-BGM implied volatilities are the common market
standard for dealer quotations for interest rate option
prices.
We document volatility smiles in euro interest rate caps
and floors across a range of maturities using the implied
‘‘flat’’ volatilities of caps and floors over our sample period.
The flat volatility is a volatility number common to all the
caplets (floorlets) in a cap (floor), which sets the sum of
their prices equal to the quoted price for the cap (floor).
Thus the flat volatility is a weighted average of the implied
volatility of individual options included in a cap or a
floor.12 Furthermore, we scale the implied volatility of
the cap/floor by the at-the-money volatility of the mid-
price (average of bid and ask price) of the cap of the same
maturity (and call it Scaled IV). This scaling accounts for
the effect of changes in the level of implied volatilities over
time. Scatter plots of the Scaled IV against the LMR for






10 Many of these deviations may not be actual violations from parity,
given the difficulty in carrying out the arbitrage using ‘‘off-market’’ swaps.
Since the bid and ask prices of ‘‘off-market’’ swaps are not available, we
cannot examine which of these observations is a real violation of put-call
parity.
11 The use of implied volatilities from the Black-Scholes model is in line
with all prior studies in the literature, including Bollen and Whaley (2004).
12 Our implied volatility estimation is likely to have much smaller errors
than those generally encountered in equity options (see, for example,
Canina and Figlewski, 1993). We pool the data for caps and floors, which
reduces any error due to mis-estimation of the underlying yield curve. The
options we consider have much longer maturities (the shortest cap/floor is
2 year maturity), which reduces this potential error further. In addition,
for most of our empirical tests, we do not include deep ITM or deep OTM
options, where estimation errors are likely to be larger. Furthermore, since
we consider the implied flat volatilities, the errors are further reduced due
to the implicit ‘‘averaging’’ in this computation.








smile curve that is approximately quadratic and steeper
for shorter maturity options than longer maturity ones.13,14
3.1. Functional forms for implied volatility smiles
Next, we estimate various functional forms for volatility
smiles using pooled time-series and cross-sectional ordin-
ary least squares regressions, in order to understand the
overall form of the volatility smile over our entire sample
period. The most common functional forms for the volatil-
ity smile used in the literature are quadratic functions of
either moneyness or the logarithm of moneyness. In addi-
tion, the scatter plots of Scaled IV against LMR suggest
a quadratic form. Therefore, we estimate the following
functional form:
Scaled IV ¼ c1þ c2  LMRþ c3  LMR2: ð1Þ
We also estimate an asymmetric quadratic functional form,
where the slope is allowed to differ for in-the-money and
out-of-the-money options, with similar results. (Polynomi-
als of higher order turn out to be statistically insignificant.)
In addition, we estimate the volatility smiles on the bid-side
and the ask-side separately. Using the mid-point of the
bid–ask prices may not always accurately display the true
smile in the implied volatility functions, given that bid–
ask spreads differ across strike rates.
Fig. 1 presents the plots of fitted implied volatility func-
tions based on specification (1) for caps and floors sepa-
rately for different maturities. These plots clearly show a
smile curve for these options and display some interesting
patterns. Caps always display a smile, which flattens as
the maturity of the cap increases. In-the-money caps
(LMR > 0) have a significantly steeper smile than out-of-
the-money caps. More interestingly, the ask-side of the
smile is steeper than the bid-side, the difference being signif-
icantly larger for in-the-money caps. Floors display some-
what similar patterns. The smile gets flatter as the
maturity of the floor increases. In-the-money floors
(LMR<0) exhibit a significantly steeper smile, especially
for short-term floors. Long-term floors display almost a
‘‘smirk’’, instead of a smile. As with caps, the smile curve
for floors is steeper on the ask-side, as compared to that
on the bid-side.13 The scatter plots have not been presented in the paper to save space,
and are available from the authors.
14 In addition, we analyze the principal components of the changes in the
Black volatility surface (across strike rates and maturities) for caps and
floors. If away-from-the-money option prices were just mechanical
transformations of ATM option prices, we would observe a very high
proportion of the variation in these implied volatilities being explained by
just one principal component. However, we find four significant principal
components on the ask-side and two on the bid-side, indicating that the
implied volatilities for away-from-the-money options are not just being
adjusted by the dealer using a mechanical rule anchored by the at-the-
money volatilities.

















































































































Fig. 1. Functional forms of implied volatility smiles in interest rate caps and floors. This figure presents the fitted smile functions for the bid and ask
implied flat volatilities of euro interest rate caps and floors separately, across different maturities. The horizontal axis in the plots corresponds to the
logarithm of the moneyness ratio (LMR), defined as the ratio of the par swap rate to the strike rate of the option. The vertical axis in the plots corresponds
to the implied flat volatility of the bid and ask prices of the option, scaled by the at-the-money volatility for the option of similar maturity (Scaled IV). The
fitted values are calculated using a quadratic function of LMR as in specification (1). The plots are three representative maturities – 2-year, 5-year, and 10-
year for the period, Jan 99 – May 01, for various maturities, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group.
16 We also plotted the scaled and unscaled implied volatilities, respec-
tively against the volatility and maturity adjusted moneyness measure.
(These plots are not included in the paper to conserve space, and are
available from the authors, upon request.) Longer maturity caps and
floors still have a flatter smile, so the transformation of the moneyness
scale does not appear to change the pattern of the smiles across maturities.
In addition, these scatter plots are very similar to the ones that use LMR
as the moneyness measure. Therefore, in the Euro interest rate options
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In Table 1, we report the results for caps and floors
pooled together for specification (1). The regression coeffi-
cients in almost all the maturities are highly significant. In
addition, the quadratic functional form explains a high
proportion of the variability in the scaled implied volatili-
ties.15 The coefficient of the curvature of the smile decreases
with the maturity of the options, indicating that as the
maturity of these options increases, the smile flattens, and
eventually converts into a ‘‘smirk’’ when we reach the 10-
year maturity. In addition, we re-estimate these specifica-
tions using a volatility and maturity adjusted moneyness
measure (log(Swap Rate/Strike Rate)/(ATM Volatil-
ity*(Maturity)
1/2)) instead of LMR), similar to the one
used in Carr and Wu (2003a,b), Li and Pearson (2004).
We still observe similar smile patterns, with a flattening
of the smile curve with maturity, consistent with the find-
ings of Backus et al. (1997) for currency options, where15 We also conducted the same exercise with spot volatilities i.e. using
inferred prices of individual caplets and floorlets, obtained by bootstrap-
ping from the flat volatilities of caps and floors. Model (1) fits well there as
well. Those results are not presented here to conserve space.
Please cite this article in press as: Deuskar, P. et al., The economic de
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.012they find that the smile flattens with maturity even using
the adjusted moneyness measure.16
3.2. Time variation in volatility smiles
In Fig. 2, we present the surface plots for the fitted val-
ues of the scaled implied volatilities against moneyness
represented by the LMR using specification (1) to fit a
smile every day.17 The shapes of these surface plots showmarkets, the shape of the smile appears to be the same regardless of the
measure of moneyness, simple or adjusted.
17 These plots are presented for representative maturities of 2-, 5-, and 10-
years, since the plots for the other maturities are similar. In addition, we
present the fitted volatility smiles over the LMR range from 0.3 to +0.3,
which is the subset of strikes over which we have enough observations to
estimate specification (1) over a substantial number of days in our dataset.
































































Functional forms for implied volatility smiles
Maturity c1 c2 c3 Adj R2
Ask
2-year 1.09 * 0.62* 3.60* 0.64
3-year 1.09* 0.15* 1.84* 0.58
4-year 1.08* 0.06* 1.38* 0.62
5-year 1.11* 0.02 0.92* 0.57
6-year 1.11* 0.10* 0.50* 0.42
7-year 1.13* 0.19* 0.36* 0.25
8-year 1.08* 0.19* 0.11* 0.47
9-year 1.07* 0.18* 0.11* 0.51
10-year 1.13* 0.26* 0.07* 0.59
Bid
2-year 0.95* 0.72* 2.40* 0.53
3-year 0.98* 0.30* 0.87* 0.30
4-year 0.98* 0.17* 0.69* 0.33
5-year 0.99* 0.12* 0.55* 0.40
6-year 0.99* 0.01 0.36* 0.39
7-year 1.02* 0.11* 0.24* 0.52
8-year 0.98* 0.15* 0.07* 0.54
9-year 0.97* 0.14* 0.09* 0.59
10-year 1.03* 0.20* 0.06* 0.64
This table presents regression results when the scaled implied flat volatility
for euro interest rate caps and floors, for various maturities, is regressed
on a quadratic function of the Log Moneyness Ratio (LMR), as follows:
Scaled IV ¼ c1þ c2  LMRþ c3  LMR2
The statistics are presented for the period, Jan 99 – May 01, for various
maturities, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and
Fixed Income Group. The coefficient and regression statistics are pre-
sented for caps and floors pooled together, separately for bid and ask
prices, for all maturities. An asterisk implies significance at the 5% level.
18 These structures involve option-spread positions and are traded in the
OTC interest rate and currency markets as explicit contracts. These prices
are often used in the industry for calibrating interest rate option models.
See, for example, Wystup (2003).
19 Time-series plots of the risk reversal and the butterfly spread over our
sample period show that both the slope and the curvature of the smile
change almost on a daily basis, with the slope being more volatile than the
curvature. The fluctuations in the slope of the smile are higher in the
second half of our sample period, which is also one where interest rates
increased. These variables could potentially be linked with each other
through lead/lag relationships, which is one of the central issues that we
examine in this paper. These plots have not been presented in the paper to
conserve space, and are available from the authors.
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similar trends – the 2-year maturity contracts display a
large curvature in the volatility smile, while the smile flat-
tens out and turns into more of a skew as we move
towards the longer maturity contracts, especially at the
10-year maturity. More importantly, both the curvature
and the slope of the volatility smile show significant time
variation, sometimes even on a daily basis. The changes in
the curvature and slope over time are more pronounced
for the 2-year maturity contracts, although they are also
perceptible for the longer maturity contracts. Fig. 2 also
presents the surface plot of the euro spot interest rates
for maturities from one to ten years, which also shows
significant time variation in level and slope over our sam-
ple period.
Based on these figures, the natural question to ask is
whether on a time-series basis, certain economic variables
exhibit a significant relationship with the implied volatil-
ity smile patterns. In order to examine this question, we
first need to define appropriate measures of the asymme-
try and curvature of the smile curve each day. We can
then determine empirical proxies for these attributes
and estimate them using the volatility smile curve, each
day. The measure of the asymmetry of the implied vola-
tility curve, widely used by practitioners, is the ‘‘risk
reversal,’’ which is the difference in the implied volatilityPlease cite this article in press as: Deuskar, P. et al., The economic de
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.012O
F
of the in-the-money and out-of-the-money options
(roughly equally above and below the at-the-money strike
rate). The measure of the curvature is the ‘‘butterfly
spread,’’ which is the difference between the average of
the implied volatilities of two away-from-the-money vola-
tilities and the at-the-money volatility.18 The advantage
of using these empirical measures is that they explicitly
capture the slope and the curvature of the smile curve.
Therefore, they can be interpreted as proxies for the
skewness and kurtosis of the risk-neutral distribution of
interest rates.
We fit a quadratic function of the LMR to the scaled
implied volatilities each day and use the fitted values to
construct the risk reversal (RR) and butterfly spread
(BS), defined as follows:R
ORR ¼ Scaled IVþ0:25LMR  Scaled IV0:25LMR





The butterfly spread captures the average scaled implied
volatility at 0.25 LMR away-from-the-money, on either
side of 0. It is essentially a linear transformation of the cur-
vature coefficient from the quadratic function. Hence, it is
our proxy for the curvature of the smile. The risk reversal
represents the difference between the implied volatility of
in-the-money options and out-of-the-money options. It is
a linear transformation of the slope coefficient from the
quadratic function. Thus, it is a proxy for the asymmetry
in the slope of the smile.19
It is important to note that we estimate the risk rever-
sal and the butterfly spread by only going away-from-
the-money by 0.25 LMR on either side of the at-the-
money strike rate. To understand the moneyness levels
in terms of actual contract strikes, consider a cap with
an at-the-money strike rate of 4%. In this case, a cap
with an LMR of 0.25 would have a strike rate of about
3.1%, while a cap with an LMR of 0.25 would have a
strike rate of about 5.1%. These strike rates are well
within the range of actively traded caps in terms of

































Fig. 2. Time variation in volatility smiles and the Euro term structure. This figure presents surface plots showing the time variation in the implied flat
volatilities of euro interest rate caps and floors as well as the term structure of euro interest rates over the period Jan 99 – May 01. In figures a, b, and c,
The horizontal axes correspond to the logarithm of the moneyness ratio, LMR, (defined as the ratio of the par swap rate to the strike rate of the option),
and time. The vertical axis corresponds to the implied volatility of the mid-price (average of bid and ask price) of the option scaled by the at-the-money
volatility for the option of similar maturity (Scaled IV). The values presented are the fitted values from a quadratic function of LMR as specified in Eq. (1)
estimated every day. Figure D depicts the Euro spot rate surface by maturity (in years) over time (daily). The vertical axis corresponds to the spot rates.
The horizontal axes correspond to the maturity of the spot rate and time, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income
Group.
20 This time-series regression is estimated by including AR(2) error terms
to correct for serial correlation. We find no serial correlation in the
residuals after this correction. In addition, for all maturities, the Durbin–
Watson statistic is insignificantly different from 2. Therefore, the inclusion
of the AR(2) error terms, indeed, takes care of any serial correlation in the
regression model.
21 We also estimate this equation using the slope and curvature of the
smile obtained from unscaled (absolute) implied volatilities, as well as
using volatility and maturity adjusted moneyness (in the spirit of Li and
Pearson (2004)). The results, which are similar, are not reported in the
paper to save space, but are available upon request from the authors.
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R4. The determinants of the volatility smile
One of the objectives of this paper is to examine the
determinants of the volatility smiles in interest rate option
markets. A clear understanding of the determinants of
these smile patterns can help in developing models that
eventually explain the entire smile. To this end, we
explore the contemporaneous relationship between the
slope and curvature of the daily smiles and several eco-
nomic and liquidity variables. The economic determinants
include the level of volatility of at-the-money interest rate
options (ATMVol), the spot 6-month Euribor (6Mrate),
the slope of the term structure captured by the difference
between the 5-year rate and the 6-month rate (5yr6M-
slope), the default spread defined as the 6-month Trea-
sury-Euribor spread (DefSpread), and the scaled ATM
bid–ask spreads (atmBAS) as a proxy of liquidity costs
in the market. These are time-series regressions of curva-
ture and asymmetry measures calculated using data acrossPlease cite this article in press as: Deuskar, P. et al., The economic de
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.012all the strikes each day. The regression specifications are
as follows:20,21
BS ¼ c1þ c2 ATMVolþ c3  6Mrateþ c4  5yr6Mslope
þ c5 DefSpreadþ c6  atmBAS
RR ¼ d1þ d2 ATMVolþ d3  6Mrate
þ d4  5yr6Mslopeþ d5 DefSpreadþ d6  atmBAS:
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The intuition for examining these independent variables is
as follows. First, the at-the-money volatility variable is
added to examine whether the patterns of the smile vary
significantly with the level of uncertainty in the market.
During more uncertain times, reflected by higher volatility,
market makers may charge higher than normal asking
prices for away-from-the-money options, since they may
be more averse to taking short position at these strike rates.
This would lead to a steeper smile, especially on the ask-
side of the smile curve. Also, during times of greater uncer-
tainty, a risk-averse market maker may demand higher
compensation for providing liquidity to the market, which
would affect the shape of the smile. Since we have already
divided the volatility of each option by the volatility of the
corresponding ATM cap to obtain the scaled IV, we use the
ATM swaption volatility (of comparable maturity), a gen-
eral measure of the future interest rate volatility, as an
explanatory variable here, in order to avoid having the
same variable on both sides of the regression equation.22
Second, we include the spot 6-month Euribor and the
slope of the yield curve as indicators of general economic
conditions, as well as the direction of interest rate changes
in the future – for example, if interest rates are mean-
reverting, very low interest rates are likely to be followed
by rate increases. Similarly, an upward-sloping yield curve
is also indicative of future rate increases. This would man-
ifest itself in a higher demand for out-of-the-money caps in
the market, thus affecting the prices of these options, and
possibly the shape of the implied volatility smile itself.23
Our next variable, the default spread, is often used as a
measure of aggregate liquidity as well as the default risk of
the constituent banks in the Euribor fixing. A wider spread
indicates a higher default risk for the constituent banks,
and possibly also higher risk of default of interest rate
option dealers. It could affect the prices of away-from-
the-money options more than the prices of ATM options,
thus affecting the shape of the smile.
We also include a measure of the at-the-money relative
bid–ask spreads of these options. The objective of includ-
ing this variable is to directly control for the explicit liquid-
ity of these options, while examining the relationship of the
other economic variables to the volatility smile. The rela-
tive bid–ask spreads of ATM options capture the general
level of liquidity in the market.
The results from this regression analysis are presented in
Table 2. The curvature of the smile is positively and signif-
icantly related to the 6-month interest rate, with the effect









22 Although swaption implied volatilities are not exactly the same as the
cap/floor implied volatility, they both tend to move together. Hence,
swaption implied volatilities are a valid proxy for the perceived
uncertainty in the future interest rates. The data on the ATM swaption
volatility in the Euro market was obtained from DataStream.
23 The ATM volatility and the term structure variables act as approx-
imate controls for a model of interest rates that displays skewness and
excess kurtosis. Typically, in such models the future distribution of interest
rates depends on today’s volatility and the level of interest rates.








rates are high, the away-from-the-money options, espe-
cially the ones with shorter maturities, are priced relatively
higher than during times when interest rates are low. On
the other hand, the curvature of the smile is negatively
related to the slope of the term structure; interestingly, this
effect is significant only for the longer maturity options. It
appears that the volatility smiles in this market have more
curvature when the term structure is relatively flat. These
results are consistent for the bid- as well as the ask-side
quotations.
The results also show that the degree of curvature is neg-
atively related to the volatility of at-the-money options,
although this effect is significant mostly for short/medium
maturity options. Therefore, highly volatile periods tend
to be associated with a lower curvature of the smile, which
is consistent with the evidence in the equity options litera-
ture (Pena et al., 1999). These results suggest a stochastic
volatility framework with the volatility itself exhibiting
mean reversion. In such a model, high-volatility periods
are likely to be followed by lower volatility periods, which
would result in a shallow smile when volatility is high. We
also find weak evidence of the curvature of the smile being
positively related to the liquidity costs in the market, but
this effect is significant only for long maturity options on
the ask-side. This is understandable, since higher liquidity
costs i.e. higher costs of continuously hedging the options
positions would of more concern in case of away from the
money options and longer maturities. Therefore, especially
for longer maturity options, it may be important to account
for liquidity effects while modeling the volatility smile.
The slope of the volatility smile (RR) exhibits somewhat
different relationships to the contemporaneous determi-
nants examined in this section. When the short-term inter-
est rate is high, the RR appears to be more negative,
especially for longer maturity options. Since the RR is
the difference between Scaled IVs at +0.25 LMR and
0.25 LMR, it is important to understand the effects sepa-
rately for caps and floors. A negative (positive) LMR refers
to out-of-the-money caps (floors). A negative relationship
between 6-month rate and RR implies that when interest
rates increase (decrease), out-of-the-money caps (floors)
become disproportionately expensive. These results are
quite intuitive. It is possible that the demand for out-of-
the-money caps (floors) is higher when interest rates go
up (down). Then, consistent with the findings of Bollen
and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu et al. (2006), demand
pressure may affect the prices of interest rate options at
some strikes, thereby affecting the shape of the volatility
smile. Similarly, when the term structure becomes more
steeply upward sloping, the smile becomes more negative.
An upward-sloping yield curve is a signal that interest rates
will increase in the future, thereby leading to higher
demand for out-of-the-money caps, which would make
the volatility smile more negative. An alternate way of
thinking about this effect is that the slope of the yield curve
captures the skew of the distribution of future interest




















































Effects of economic variables on volatility smiles
Maturity c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 Adj R2
Panel A: BS
Ask
2-year 0.44** 1.99** 8.23** 1.61 1.38** 0.01 0.92
5-year 0.01 0.14 2.76** 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.97
10-year 0.02 0.12 0.78* 1.05* 0.04 0.04** 0.95
Bid
2-year 0.46** 1.90** 3.45** 1.83 1.87** 0.21* 0.86
5-year 0.10** 0.61** 0.76** 0.49 0.46** 0.09 0.58
10-year 0.09** 0.51** 0.03 1.03** 0.01 0.09** 0.79
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 Adj R2
Panel B: RR
Ask
2-year 2.42** 2.42** 41.57* 11.32 2.05* 0.25 0.86
5-year 0.69** 0.33 12.62** 14.91** 0.58** 0.02 0.73
10-year 0.41* 0.07 5.53** 9.53** 0.37 0.13 0.89
Bid
2-year 0.75 2.87** 5.90 10.60 3.64** 0.01 0.94
5-year 0.44** 0.20 10.89** 5.30** 0.30 0.12 0.90
10-year 0.17* 0.24 3.01** 2.88* 0.52** 0.66** 0.89
This table presents regression results for the impact of economic and liquidity variables on the curvature of the volatility smile (as proxied by the butterfly
spread, BS) and asymmetry in the volatility smile (as proxied by risk reversal, RR):
BS ¼ c1þ c2 ATMVolþ c3  6Mrateþ c4  5yr6Mslopeþ c5 DefSpreadþ c6  atmBAS
RR ¼ d1þ d2 ATMVolþ d3  6Mrateþ d4  5yr6Mslopeþ d5 DefSpreadþ d6  atmBAS
The statistics are presented for the period, Jan 99 – May 01, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group and
DataStream. The coefficients and regression statistics are presented for the pooled sample of caps and floors, separately for bid and ask prices. Lagged
error terms are included in the regression equation to correct for serial correlation. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level,
respectively. The results are presented for three representative maturities – 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year.
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Finally, we find some evidence that the slope of the smile
curve is related to the default spread. However, this rela-
tionship is not consistent across all maturities. Perhaps
there is a relation between RR and the leads or lags of
the default spread. The nature of such dynamic relation-
ships between the economic variables and the volatility
smile is what we explore in the next section.
5. Multivariate vector autoregression
In the previous section, we show that economic variables
are significantly related to the shape of the contemporane-
ous smile. In this section, we examine the relationship
between the lagged values of economic variables and the
shape of the smile, and vice versa. We estimate a six-equa-
tion, multivariate, vector autoregression separately for the
butterfly spread and the risk reversal, each of which
includes the five economic and liquidity variables (ATM
volatility, 6-month rate, the slope of the term structure,
the default spread, and the ATM bid–ask spreads).24 This
framework can provide useful information on the linkages
between the economic variables and the volatility smile in a584
585
586
24 We thank Rob Engle for insightful discussions on the econometric
procedures used in this section.
Please cite this article in press as: Deuskar, P. et al., The economic de
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.012dynamic, predictive sense. We choose the appropriate num-
ber of lags for the multivariate VAR estimation in each
case, using the Akaike information criterion (AIC). For
most option maturities, this estimation results in two or
three lags, with the maximum number of lags in any system
being five. We estimate 36 VAR models (9 option maturi-
ties each, for the bid and ask sides, separately for BS and
RR) that provide a comprehensive description of the
time-series movements in the shape of the smile and the
economic and liquidity variables.
We first examine the cross-correlations of the innova-
tions obtained from the VAR system. Unexpected shocks
to any of the economic variables may be related to the
unexpected fluctuations in the shape of the volatility smile.
These correlations are presented in Table 3. The most strik-
ing relationship noticed from the table is the negative cor-
relation between the shocks to the slope of the term
structure and the shocks to the curvature and slope of
the volatility smile, which is consistent with our results in
the previous section. It appears that unexpected twists in
the term structure, which may be proxies for unexpected
changes in the higher moments of the risk-neutral distribu-
tion of interest rates, are related to unexpected changes in
the shape of the volatility smile curve. To a lesser degree,






















































Correlations in VAR innovations
Ask Bid
ATM vol. 6 m
Rate

















2-year 0.06 0.15** 0.03 0.13** 0.00 0.01 0.29** 0.02 0.22** 0.06
5-year 0.06 0.15** 0.01 0.04 0.16** 0.07 0.04 0.10** 0.10** 0.02
10-year 0.05 0.14** 0.14** 0.08* 0.13** 0.10** 0.12** 0.08 0.07 0.15**
RR
2-year 0.08 0.26** 0.18** 0.19** 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.16** 0.24** 0.00
5-year 0.02 0.04 0.46** 0.13** 0.06 0.00 0.09** 0.21** 0.05 0.04
10-year 0.04 0.13** 0.14** 0.09* 0.07 0.08* 0.07 0.03 0.16** 0.15**
This table presents the correlations between innovations from the multivariate vector autoregression for six variables – the level of volatility of at-the-
money interest rate options (ATM vol.), the spot 6-month Euribor (6 m rate), the slope of the term structure (5 years rate – 6 m rate), the 6-month
Treasury-Euribor spread (Default Spread), the scaled ATM bid–ask spreads (ATM BA spread) and butterfly spread (BS) or risk reversal (RR) separately
for ask and bid sides for the period Jan 99 – May 01, based on data obtained fromWestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group and DataStream.
The correlations between innovations of the smile variables (BS/RR) and innovations and other variables are presented below. ** and * represent p-values
less than or equal to 5% and 10%, respectively. The results are presented for three representative maturities – 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year.
10 P. Deuskar et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance xxx (2007) xxx–xxx
JBF 2630 No. of Pages 15, Model 5+
20 September 2007; Disk Used
ARTICLE IN PRESSC
itively correlated with the shocks to the shape of the smile,
especially to the butterfly spread. An unexpected increase
in interest rates may trigger expectations of extreme moves
in interest rates in the future, which would cause the butter-
fly spread to increase. Similarly, we find some relationship
between shocks to the default spread and shocks to the
shape of the volatility smile. In addition, the shocks to
the liquidity of at-the-money options appear to be posi-
tively related to the shocks to the butterfly spread, espe-
cially for longer maturities. This suggests that when
liquidity dries up, the away-from-the-money options (espe-
cially longer maturity) become disproportionately more
expensive, as reflected in the increase in the curvature of













25 Usually the Cholesky decomposition is sensitive to the ordering of the
VAR. We order the VAR from the most exogenous variable to the most
endogenous variable, based on the results of Granger–causality tests.
However, our empirical results are robust to changes in the ordering of
these variables in the VAR.
26 We also examined the response of the butterfly spread to the slope of
the yield curve computed in the manner explained above. Although
Granger–causality points to the slope of the yield curve having informa-






R5.1. The predictors of the volatility smile
In Table 4, we present the pair-wise Granger–causality
tests between the butterfly spread or risk reversal and the
five economic variables, separately for the bid- and ask-
side, for each maturity. Panel A of the table presents the
p-values for rejecting the null hypothesis that variable i
Granger-causes the shape of the smile (butterfly spread or
risk reversal), by testing whether the lag coefficients of var-
iable i are jointly zero when the dependent variable in the
VAR is BS or RR. We find evidence that for most option
maturities, the 6-month interest rate and the slope of the
term structure Granger-cause the butterfly spread. There-
fore, these yield curve variables have an impact not only
on the contemporaneous BS, as seen from Tables 3 and
4, but also on the future BS. Similarly, we find some evi-
dence that the 6-month interest rate Granger-causes the
risk reversal. Thus, while the slope of the yield curve is
related to contemporaneous RR, it is the spot rate that
has predictive information about future values of RR.
These results show that past realizations of the term struc-





ity smiles in this market. We also find some information in
past values of the at-the-money volatility and liquidity
costs in predicting the curvature of the volatility smile,
but these effects are weaker.
Next, we present the impulse responses based on the
multivariate VAR standardized by Cholesky decomposi-
tion. For the sake of brevity, we only show those cases
where we do find Granger–causality. Panel A of Fig. 3 pre-
sents the response of the butterfly spread to a one Cholesky
standard deviation shock to the 6 month rate. The ordering
of the VAR for this purpose is the 6-month rate, the 5 years
rate – 6 m rate differential, the default spread, the ATM BA
Spread, BS, and ATM vol.25 On the ask-side, except for the
2-year cap, a positive shock to the short-term interest rate
results in an increase in the butterfly spread. The effect is
significant initially, and remains so for 5-year and shorter
maturities. For longer maturities, the effect becomes insig-
nificant as the horizon progresses. On the bid-side the
results are qualitatively similar.26
Panel B of Fig. 3 shows the response of the risk reversal
to one Cholesky standard deviation shock to the 6 month
interest rate. The ordering of the VAR in this case is the
6-month rate, the RR, the 5 years rate – 6 m rate differen-
tial, the default spread, the ATM vol, and the ATM BA
Spread. On the ask-side, except for the short-term maturi-
ties like the 2-year, there is a decrease in the risk reversal






















































































Panel A: Null Hypothesis – presented variables do not individually Granger-cause the butterfly spread (BS)/risk reversal (RR) on the ask/bid side
BS
2-year 0.61 0.05** 0.98 0.73 0.65 0.43 0.05** 0.09* 0.44 0.97
5-year 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.57 0.04** 0.38 0.22 0.06* 0.07* 0.74
10-year 0.29 0.33 0.12 0.04** 0.71 0.00** 0.70 0.00** 0.40 0.75
RR
2-year 0.58 0.92 0.74 0.81 0.16 0.89 0.18 0.81 0.46 0.11
5-year 0.00** 0.00** 0.30 0.47 0.22 0.26 0.00** 0.00** 0.06* 0.73
10-year 0.01** 0.09* 0.00** 0.69 0.42 0.85 0.13 0.00** 0.50 0.00**
Panel B: Null Hypothesis – Butterfly spread (BS)/risk reversal (RR) on the ask/bid side do not Granger-cause each of the presented variables
BS
2-year 0.58 0.28 0.69 0.15 0.80 0.92 0.12 0.34 0.27 0.72
5-year 0.58 0.28 0.01** 0.16 0.60 0.95 0.47 0.81 0.72 0.60
10-year 0.00** 0.77 0.92 0.01** 0.21 0.31 0.15 0.38 0.84 0.00**
RR
2-year 0.83 0.78 0.45 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.79 0.02** 0.13
5-year 0.14 0.39 0.02** 0.28 0.00** 0.67 0.04** 0.19 0.10 0.08*
10-year 0.81 0.22 0.16 0.00** 0.00** 0.19 0.97 0.37 0.02** 0.00**
This table presents results for the Granger–causality tests based on the multivariate vector autoregression for six variables - the level of volatility of at-the-
money interest rate options (ATM vol.), the spot 6-month Euribor (6 m rate), the slope of the term structure (5 years rate – 6 m rate), the 6-month
Treasury-Euribor spread (Default spread), the scaled ATM bid–ask spreads (ATM BA spread) and butterfly spread (BS) or risk reversal (RR) separately
for ask and bid sides for the period Jan 99 – May 01, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group and DataStream.
The p-values for rejecting the null hypothesis of ‘‘No Granger–Causality’’ are given below. ** and * represent p-values less than or equal to 5% and 10%,
respectively. The results are presented for three representative maturities – 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year.
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The results are consistent with the intuition that an increase
in the short-term interest rate is followed by an increase in
the prices of the out-of-the-money caps, since investors are
now more concerned about hedging the risk of rising inter-
est rates. Hence, the prices of out-the-money caps
(LMR < 0) relative to in-the-money caps (LMR > 0)
increase, thereby decreasing the risk reversal. An alternate
way of thinking about this result is that investors are less
concerned about hedging the risk of decreasing interest
rates. Therefore, the prices of out-of-the-money floors
(LMR > 0) relative to in-the-money floors (LMR < 0)
decrease. The results on the bid-side are similar.
Table 5 presents the variance decompositions of the but-
terfly spread and risk reversal. It shows how much each of
the variables contributes towards the variance of the error
in forecasting the shape of the smile. The bulk of the vari-
ance of the forecast error in the butterfly spread or risk
reversal is attributable to the innovations in that variable
itself. For butterfly spreads at shorter maturity, the 6-
month interest rate contributes around 2% towards the
forecast error variance at the horizon of one day. This con-
tribution increases to around 6% at the 10-day horizon.
The contributions are smaller for higher maturities. At-
the-money volatility is another variable that contributes
towards the forecast error variance of butterfly spread.
For the risk reversal as well, innovations to the 6-month
rate are the next contributing factor, after innovations to
the risk reversal itself. Excluding the 2-year maturity, thePlease cite this article in press as: Deuskar, P. et al., The economic de
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.012contribution of innovations to the short rate starts at
around 1% at a 1-day horizon and goes up to 4–5% at
the 10-day horizon.
5.2. Information in the volatility smile
Panel B of Table 4 presents p-values for the null hypoth-
esis that the shape of the smile (measured by the BS or RR)
does not Granger-cause any of the other variables of inter-
est. We find that the shape of the volatility smile plays a
role in predicting some of the economic variables. In partic-
ular, the risk reversal Granger-causes the 6-month default
spread, implying that the asymmetry in the volatility smile
curves is useful for predicting the default spread in the
Euribor market. This is intuitive since the option prices
are forward looking. More importantly, our results suggest
that the asymmetry in the prices of out-the-money options
as compared to those for in-the-money options (which is
the cause of the asymmetry in the volatility smile) have
information about the future economic outlook, since the
default spread is a reflection of the expectations for aggre-
gate default risk in the economy.
Panel C of Fig. 3 presents the response of the default
spread to a one Cholesky standard deviation shock to risk
reversal computed in a manner similar to earlier responses.
The ordering of the VAR in this case is 6-month rate, RR,
the 5 years rate – 6 m rate spread, the default spread, the
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10-yr
Panel A: Response of the butterfly spread to the 6-month interest rate
Panel B: Response of the risk reversal to the 6-month interest rate
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10-yr
Fig. 3. Impulse responses. This figure presents impulse responses computed from the multivariate vector autoregression for six variables – the level of
volatility of at-the-money interest rate options (ATM vol.), the spot 6-month Euribor (6 m rate), the slope of the term structure (5 years rate – 6 m rate),
the 6-month Treasury-Euribor spread (Default spread), the scaled ATM bid–ask spreads (ATM BA spread) and butterfly spread (BS) or risk reversal (RR)
separately for ask and bid sides for the period Jan 99 – May 01, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group and
DataStream. The figure shows response for three representative maturities – 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year. VARs are ordered as follows: for BS 6 m Rate, 5
years rate – 6 m Rate, Default Spread, ATM BA spread, BS, and ATM vol. and for RR 6 m Rate, RR, 5 years rate – 6 m Rate, Default Spread, ATM vol.,
and ATM BA spread. The solid line represents the ask side while the dashed line represents the bid side. Panel A: Response of the butterfly spread to the 6-
month interest rate; Panel B: Response of the risk reversal to the 6-month interest rate; Panel C: Response of the default spread to the risk reversal.
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the risk reversal for shorter maturities (up to 6-year) is fol-
lowed by a significant increase in the default spread. The
results are insignificant for higher maturities. The results
are consistent with a positive correlation, at short maturi-
ties, between unexpected shocks to risk reversal and default
spread. An increase in the risk reversal occurs during the
period when investors are more concerned about falling
interest rates (leading to enhanced interest in buying out-
of-the-money floors), which usually coincides with an eco-
nomic downturn and a consequent increase in default risk.
Panel C of Table 5 presents the decomposition of the
forecast error variance of default spread computed from
the VAR involving risk reversal. Similar to previous cases,Please cite this article in press as: Deuskar, P. et al., The economic de
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.05.012own innovations contribute the most towards forecast
error variance of default spread. However, it is interesting
to note that shocks to the risk reversal contribute up to 8%
to the variance of the forecast error. This is a result consis-
tent with what we find using Granger–causality: risk rever-
sal has information about the default spread.6. Concluding remarks
We examine the patterns of implied volatility in the euro
interest rate option markets, using data on bid and ask
prices of interest rate caps and floors across strike rates.


































Panel A: Variance decomposition of butterfly spread
2-year 1 0.4 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 97.2 0.4 0.0 8.2 0.0 1.2 0.3 90.3
10 1.1 1.7 4.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 93.3 1.1 1.2 11.8 6.2 3.9 0.2 76.7
5-year 1 0.2 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 2.2 95.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.3 97.9
10 0.6 3.5 7.6 3.0 2.3 1.9 81.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.2 5.5 0.4 91.7
10-year 1 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.9 0.1 1.6 95.4 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.1 2.2 96.1
10 0.3 4.5 1.1 0.2 5.6 0.8 87.8 0.4 11.9 1.5 1.1 0.4 2.2 82.9
Panel B: Variance decomposition of risk reversal
2-year 1 0.4 0.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.2 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.4
10 1.2 0.0 6.3 0.3 0.5 4.0 88.9 1.1 0.0 3.3 0.3 0.9 4.0 91.4
5-year 1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.1
10 0.6 2.3 5.8 0.6 0.5 1.1 89.7 0.6 1.0 5.9 1.7 3.2 0.1 88.2
10-year 1 0.2 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.4 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.5
10 0.4 2.5 3.3 2.6 0.4 1.7 89.5 0.4 0.6 3.4 1.5 0.1 8.2 86.2
Panel C: Variance decomposition of default spread
2-year 1 0.4 0.0 9.6 0.2 88.9 0.0 1.4 0.4 0.0 16.5 0.0 79.0 0.0 4.6
10 1.2 2.6 17.7 2.1 74.4 0.6 2.7 1.1 1.0 27.7 0.3 57.3 1.2 12.5
5-year 1 0.2 0.0 12.4 0.3 85.4 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.0 12.6 0.0 86.8 0.0 0.6
10 0.6 1.4 19.7 0.8 73.5 0.3 4.5 0.6 1.5 20.0 0.4 73.0 0.3 4.7
10-year 1 0.2 0.0 12.6 0.0 87.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 13.0 0.1 85.2 0.0 1.7
10 0.4 0.3 17.5 0.5 73.5 1.5 6.7 0.4 0.4 17.7 0.6 68.8 4.5 8.1
This table presents the variance decompositions (%) computed from the multivariate vector autoregression for six variables – the level of volatility of at-the-money interest rate options (ATM vol.), the
spot 6-month Euribor (6 m rate), the slope of the term structure (5 years rate – 6 m rate), the 6-month Treasury-Euribor spread (Default spread), the scaled ATM bid–ask spreads (ATM BA spread) and
butterfly spread (BS) or risk reversal (RR) separately for ask and bid sides for the period Jan 99 – May 01, based on data obtained from WestLB Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group and
DataStream. The VAR is ordered as 6 m Rate, 5 years rate – 6 m Rate, Default spread, ATM BA spread, BS, ATM vol. in case of butterfly spread and as 6 m Rate, RR, 5 years rate – 6 m Rate, Default
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rates for these options, separately on the bid-side and the
ask-side, and find that the volatility smile curve is clearly
evident in this market.
We further examine the impact of economic variables on
the volatility smile curves. We include the level of volatility
and interest rates to control for the effects arising out of a
more elaborate model of interest rates. We find that these
term structure variables have significant explanatory ability
for the time variation in the shape of the smile. During a
high-interest rate regime, the smile appears to be steeper
and more skewed. When the yield curve is sloping upward
more steeply, the smile in the interest rate options is flatter
but more skewed. In addition, when the level of volatility in
the interest rate markets is high, the smile is flatter, consis-
tent with mean-reverting stochastic volatility.
We investigate the behavior of the relationship between
the yield curve variables and the shape of the smile over
time and find that it is not static but dynamic. The yield
curve variables have information about the future shape
of the smile in the interest rate options market. Thus, past
values of yield curve variables can be used to formulate and
implement hedging and risk management strategies for the
interest rate options. We also find that the shape of the
smile has information about future default spreads. Thus,
past prices of interest rate options can be useful for valuing
and hedging credit derivatives. Many of the dealers of
interest rate options are also likely to have positions in
the credit derivatives. This link between interest rate
options and default spread can be useful for the risk man-
agement at the firm level.
Our results suggest that understanding the dynamic rela-
tionship between the economic variables and the shape of
the smile is important for developing valuation models
for interest rate options. In future research, these results
should be extended to other time periods and currencies.
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